軍武

以前听说北泡菜的弹道导弹射程覆盖了全中国.

日本今年計畫明年要跟美國下定戰斧巡弋飛彈，這款射程1500km。然後澳洲也想買，似乎美國已批可。
https://www.ctwant.com/article/278215

沒核彈頭都是BB彈

>>1199323
還是個畫餅就拿出來公開要價
雖說昂薩打從地中海販賣奴隸始就是不知良心為何物的主
可也不帶這麼坑人的罷？

我看錯了位數
是50枚，總價值為1.04億美元，單價200萬。

>>1199367
據稱2024開始交貨

>>1199366
可以裝W80核彈頭，只是尚未認證

>>1199368
大家都記得日本買全球鷹這蠢事
>>1199369
你不如說這個彈頭可以裝普丁，一發打出去就直接滅俄好了

>>1199369
拉夫羅夫也說F-16可以裝核彈，北約若敢給烏克蘭F-16，俄國將會視同核威脅加以回應。

>>1199379
>>1199385
AGM-158用的WDU-42/B重450KG，而W80則是130KG
而之前W80則是安在造了1,715的AGM-86B上
W80本身則是造了2,117，因為核武器裁減大部分都處於儲存狀態

>>1199369
核彈頭(X)
直升機電池(O))

>>1199388
按你這個邏輯
普丁不到100KG，所以普丁的適裝性比W80更好
而且100發W80不一定能打死普丁，一發普丁彈頭的AGM158打出去，普丁就死定啦
結論，W80不如普丁

>>1199407
W80本身就是設計成安裝在這個大小的各種遠端武器上的
至於布丁
可以回憶一下2010年4月10日波蘭總統Lech Aleksander Kaczyński是怎麽死的，就可以推斷布丁可以自己飛出去擊墜飛機，和擊墜大廚的飛機一樣

>>1199409
科科
那裝備F16V和雲峰飛彈的台灣應該也算有核國家嘍

>>1199416
日本購入兩種可以裝備核武器的遠端武器實際上可以視為退出NPT的前置準備或者潛在威脅

增加軍費、出口武器、恢復正常國家身份之類的願望清單正在中國、北韓、俄國等國家的幫助下逐漸實現

>>1199424
醒醒...真的

>>1199455
新华社东京12月24日电 综述：日本2023财年防卫预算大增引发担忧

　　新华社记者姜俏梅　郭丹

　　日本政府23日在内阁会议上通过2023财年政府预算草案，其中防卫预算大幅增加，达6.8219万亿日元（1日元约合0.053元人民币），是上一财年的1.26倍。分析人士指出，这是日本在新版安保三文件基础上制定的“军备扩张预算”，势必加重国民负担，加剧地区局势，令人担忧。

　　从防卫预算具体内容来看，2023财年用于购买和生产远距离导弹及弹药费用增长显著。其中，获取远程攻击性导弹及相关预算高达1.4万亿日元，购买美制“战斧”巡航导弹预算为2113亿日元。防卫装备研发预算也出现巨额增长，达8968亿日元，是2022财年的3.1倍。此外，防卫装备的维护维修预算达2.0355万亿日元，是2022财年的1.8倍。

　　本月早些时候，日本正式通过新版《国家安全保障战略》《国家防卫战略》和《防卫力量整备计划》三份安保政策文件，提出日本将致力于拥有对敌攻击能力等政策主张，并将在未来5年大幅增加军事开支。根据文件，2023至2027财年，日本防卫费总额将增至约43万亿日元。

　　作为上述五年计划的开年，2023财年防卫费较上一财年增长1.4214万亿日元，高额防卫费超过公共事业费和文教科学振兴费，首次上升到第二位，仅次于社会保障费，其在日本国内生产总值占比升至1.19%。

　　由日本宪法学者和政治学者组成的立宪民主会23日发表声明，批评政府大幅提高防卫预算，指出这是独断行为，完全不顾税负可能给国民造成的负担。声明还说，政府将拥有“对敌基地攻击能力”写入新版安保三文件，等于否定战后奉行的“专守防卫”原则，势必加剧东亚地区的紧张局势，引发军备竞赛。

　　在野党日本共产党书记局长小池晃表示，2023财年防卫预算是在完全放弃“专守防卫”原则、实现战后防卫政策大转折的新版安保三文件基础上制定的军备扩张预算，是破坏宪法与和平、毁掉国民生活的战后最差预算。

　　日本多家媒体认为，防卫费大幅增长缺乏依据，政府在没有做出详细说明的情况下强行通过是不负责任的做法。防卫费暴增不得不靠新发国债补充财源，给子孙后代留下庞大财务负担。此外，防卫预算挤占地区医疗、育儿政策扶持等多项财政支出，直接波及国民生活。

　　《朝日新闻》24日发表社论说，日本政府未经细致调查研究、不顾自身财力强行推出强化防卫力预算，恐将导致无止境的军备竞赛。社论还指出，在不明确自卫队能否保持自主性的情况下，贸然加深日美一体化是危险的。

　　共同社日前就政府计划将2023至2027财年防卫费总额增至约43万亿日元进行一项舆论调查。调查结果显示，有53.6%的日本国民反对增加防卫费，赞成者为39%。

　　日本山口大学名誉教授纐缬厚日前在接受新华社记者采访时，对日本政府违背事实煽动周边国家威胁，大幅增加防卫费走“新军国主义”道路表示谴责。他说，日本存在严重的少子高龄化社会问题，大增军费只会加剧贫困问题，日本走军事大国道路就是走贫困道路。

>>1199455
A recent proposal from Japan’s governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) reportedly included a five-year timeframe to achieve its declared ambition of doubling defence spending to 2% of GDP. Opinion poll data suggests that the once pacifist-leaning electorate broadly supports a greater focus on military capability. However, there are concerns about whether Japan’s fiscal environment could support such a rapid hike in defence spending and whether the government can rely on sustained public backing for such an aim.

The LDP was re-elected in October 2021 on a platform that included the pledge to double defence spending as a proportion of GDP. In April of this year, the party’s Research Commission on National Security reportedly proposed achieving the 2% target over five years. Recent fiscal plans suggest the government is still pursuing significant uplifts in order to ‘drastically strengthen’ the country’s defences within five years. In his Keynote Address to the 19th Shangri-La Dialogue on 10th June, Prime Ministry Kishida stated his determination to secure substantial increases in Japan’s defence budget within the next five years but stopped short of recommitting to the 2% of GDP target. Nonetheless, the movement towards the 2% goal means Japan could potentially become the world’s third highest defence spender behind only the United States and China by 2027. Using IMFs projections, 2% of Japanese GDP in 2027 would come to JPY11.9 trillion (USD125 billion).

In November 2021, Japan approved a significant supplemental budget, known as the Defense-Strengthening Acceleration Package. This was done to bolster core defence spending for fiscal years 2021 and 2022 (FY21 and FY22). All this occurred against the background of recent news polls suggesting 64% – almost two-thirds – of Japanese voters support strengthening the country’s defences.

>>1199455
Taking supplements
The official justification for the new supplemental allocation was the rapidly deteriorating East Asian security environment. Japan often implements supplementary budgets for defence in response to emerging policy requirements. But the scale of the 2021 addition was notable, reaching USD6.8bn in the context of a defence budget that has averaged USD50bn over the last decade. Without the 2021 supplemental budget addition, the FY22 budget would have reached JPY5.40trn (USD47.6bn) or 0.98% of GDP compared to the final allocation of JPY6.17trn (USD54.5bn) or 1.11% of GDP.1

It is also noteworthy that detail of the supplemental funding was included in the FY22 defence budget justification, whereas in the past such funding had been addressed separately in Ministry of Finance documentation.

The greater clarity is a welcome addition and may indicate an intention to incorporate supplemental funding for defence – which has been approved every year since 2015 – into the annual core budget. This would improve both the transparency and stability of funding for the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) and enable better capability investment planning.
Uncomfortable environment
The LDP election manifesto highlighted the need to respond to ‘the rapid expansion’ of China's military capability and the ‘unilateral changes in the status quo against the backdrop of [China’s] strength’. Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has continued to reiterate the manifesto concerns in comments on the challenges posed to Tokyo by China, Russia, and what he described as unacceptable nuclear and missile development by North Korea. Responding to developments in new areas such as space and cyber, significant improvements in missile technology, and the particular requirements of island defence, Kishida pledged to quickly strengthen defence capabilities, including the option of acquiring the capability to attack enemy bases overseas.

>>1199455
Greater reach
With these security concerns in mind, investment over the past five years has been aimed at improving the stand-off capabilities of the JSDF in addition to maintaining a drumbeat of ship, submarine and vehicle production. FY20 spending included funding for the Mitsubishi ASM-3 supersonic anti-ship missile, which is currently in tests, as well as for the acquisition of Kongsberg’s subsonic Joint Strike Missile (JSM). The ASM-3 is intended for the Mitsubishi F-2 combat aircraft, with the JSM earmarked for the Japan Air Self Defense Force Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II. The modification of the two Izumo-class carriers to be able to operate the F-35B variant of the Lightning II will improve the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force’s ability to operate at greater range.

Funding began for the F-2’s successor, the F-X, in FY20, and Japan and the United Kingdom have grown increasingly close due to their respective future combat aircraft needs. Media reports have suggested that the UK’s BAE Systems could be asked to partner with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to develop the F-X aircraft, effectively displacing Lockheed Martin. The extent to which Tokyo’s F-X and the UK-led Tempest combat aircraft project eventually align has yet to be seen. However, Rolls-Royce and IHI Corporation are already working on a next-generation engine technology demonstrator, while there is also cooperation on sensors and guided-weapons.
Potential pitfalls
The FY22 defence budget justification stated the country will allocate resources more flexibly and intensively ‘without necessarily adhering to existing budget and human resource allocation’. The risks associated with increasing military spending too quickly are the same in Japan as they are for any other country. More money does not automatically translate into greater military capability: it is an enabler only.

軍火商真的很需要北韓中國俄國之類的聯手推銷北約產品

>>1199455
Rapid increases in defence investment, if not handled carefully, risk disjointed procurement activity that could hamper the long-term sustainability and effectiveness of military capabilities.

The drive towards 2% of GDP has also prompted concern from Komeito, the LDP’s junior coalition partner. According to the Komeito party leader, Yamaguchi Natsuo, the public would be unlikely to back such a move should it require tax increases or social spending cuts and it would also contradict the fundamental aim of Japan’s post-war defence policy of maintaining a defensive posture and avoiding threatening regional stability.

Beyond these reservations, the main limitations are more fiscal in nature. Japan’s public debt has reached 263% of GDP, the highest globally. As debt levels and interest rates increase, the costs of servicing that debt will continue to rise and place growing pressure on public finances. Recognising the difficult fiscal conditions and public spending pressure, the 2022 budget stated that streamlining measures would be enacted along with efforts to harmonise the government’s other spending priorities. Whether the boost in spending is achievable within this budgetary environment remains uncertain, even if the intent of politicians in Tokyo is abundantly clear.

Note: The currency conversions in this text were made using the 2022 rate given in the April 2022 World Economic Outlook.

1Both figures include SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa)-related spending which aims to mitigating the impact of military installations on local communities in Okinawa.

Japan’s New Defense Budget Is Still Not Enough
JENNIFER KAVANAGH
FEBRUARY 08, 2023
COMMENTARY
Source: Getty
Summary: Despite Tokyo’s significant commitments to increased spending, its transition may be too slow to affect U.S. military planning or to reduce the U.S. regional defense burden.
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Japan’s recent announcement that it plans to dramatically increase defense spending over the next five years was greeted with praise and relief by U.S. policymakers. But while some enthusiasm is warranted, Washington should keep its expectations in check.

Japan’s new commitments are undoubtedly significant. It intends to raise defense spending to 2 percent of GDP by 2027, or 60 percent over five years. This will give the country the third-largest defense budget in the world. Japan’s new national security strategy explains how it will take primary responsibility for its own defense within five years and assume a far more active role in Indo-Pacific security. For Washington, which is eager for more burden-sharing on efforts to deter Chinese aggression and respond to regional contingencies, these moves are encouraging: a Japan able to take responsibility for its self-defense would reduce demands placed on U.S. military forces in the region and allow the United States to focus and prioritize its investments in Asia more effectively.

However, the Japan Self-Defense Forces—while more capable by 2027 than they are today—will likely still be dependent on the United States in many ways and limited in their ability to contribute to any regional crises well into the 2030s. Given U.S. Defense and State Department expectations that China may consider taking aggressive military action against Taiwan or elsewhere in the theater on an accelerated timeline, possibly before the end of this decade, Japan’s transition may be too slow to affect U.S. planning for regional deterrence and contingency operations or to lessen the U.S. defense burden in the region.

Washington will need to keep the pressure on Tokyo to stick to and even expand its defense investment further—for example, by making U.S. military assistance to Japan conditional on continued, larger increases in Japan’s defense spending in coming years.

Japan faces a deep investment gap, and its currently planned budget increases are too small and gradual to address associated consequences in the near term. Over the past thirty years, Japan has maintained an annual defense budget of about 1 percent of its GDP. This is below the 2 percent NATO benchmark and even further from regional counterparts such as South Korea, India, and Taiwan, each of which averaged about 2.5 percent of GDP per year over this same period. Decades of low spending have left Japan’s defense force with aging physical infrastructure, low munitions stockpiles, old and insufficient air- and sealift and refueling capabilities, and too few personnel due to recruiting and retention issues.

Closing this investment gap will be difficult and take time. For example, the difference between Japan allocating 1 percent of GDP to defense rather than 2 percent from 2012–21 amounts to foregone spending on the order of $500 billion (in 2020 U.S. dollars). To fill this gap in the next five years, Japan would need to invest an additional 2 percent of GDP on top of planned increases just to offset one decade of underspending. An increase of this size would likely be politically unsustainable, but this comparison highlights how profound and long-lasting the effects of its low defense spending will be.

As it addresses shortfalls due to underspending, Japan will also need to build or acquire an extensive and expensive set of modernized and advanced systems, weapons, and infrastructure required for its self-defense against adversaries such as China and North Korea.

For example, Japan will need a reliable long-range strike capability and significantly increased numbers of long- and short-range air defense systems. U.S. Tomahawk missiles are likely to fill the long-range strike requirement in the near term, but Japan will also need to increase its supply of Type-12 missiles to bolster its defense against mobile naval targets for which Tomahawk missiles are ill-suited. Sizeable stocks of anti-aircraft and anti-ship munitions—which Japan has not typically maintained—will also be needed. Modernization of Japan’s amphibious capabilities and sea- and airlift assets will be essential for responding to Chinese aggression.

In terms of infrastructure, Japan will need to invest in advanced cyber and space capabilities, including new satellites. Airfields, ports, and highways require hardening and expansion to support more resilient operations. Resources to support enhanced capabilities and training for Japanese forces based in Southwest Japan and to stand up new command structures, including a permanent joint headquarters, will also be needed. Hardest of all, Japan will need to invest in rebuilding and restructuring its defense industrial base for indigenous production and export of arms.

This list of requirements is not complete, but it gives an indication of the enormity of demands Japan must fill if it is to take primary responsibility for its self-defense. For Japan to contribute credibly to regional contingencies like a defense of Taiwan, still greater investment—such as additional air defense to assist U.S. operations and sustainment and supply capabilities to enable logistical support—will be required.

Upgrades to and acquisition of new weapons and equipment, improvements to infrastructure, and reviving Japan’s defense sector will take years to complete, only yielding full benefits well-after 2027. Even with Japan’s new commitments, the United States should expect its defense burden in the Indo-Pacific to remain largely unchanged for some time.

This piece is part of the Renewing American Statecraft series.

>>1199323
你美國又玩星戰這套把可真是選錯對手了
先把aim260、高超音速導彈在朗朗乾坤下示眾罷

南韓軍方表示，8月30日在當地時間深夜11時許偵測到北韓從平壤順安或周邊地區發射了兩枚彈道導彈，兩次發射相隔約十分鐘，又指每枚導彈都飛行約360公里後落入海中，情報部門正作進一步分析。
日本防衛省亦指，北韓發射的兩枚彈道導彈，飛行距離分別約350和400公里，飛行高度約50公里，並落入日本專屬經濟區外的海域。

分析認為，北韓這次試射可能是針對韓美正在進行的「乙支自由護盾」聯合軍演。軍演在本月21日展開，定於今日結束。而昨日在黃海上空進行的空中演習，有至少一架美國B-1B戰略轟炸機參與。

裁判非公开进行, 中国側没有透露哪些行为违反法律.

https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20230830/k10014179131000.html

中国で日本人男性起訴
スパイ行為などとみられる疑いで拘束

2023/08/30

このうち、9人が中国の裁判で実刑判決となり服役しましたが、裁判は非公開で、中国側はどのような行為が法律に違反したのか明らかにしていません。

https://www.umk.co.jp/news/?date=20230831&id=20146

新田原基地にF-35B飛行隊を来年度新設
宮崎県

2023/08/31

防衛省が31日に発表した来年度予算の概算要求には、新田原基地に「臨時F-35B飛行隊」を新設することが盛り込まれました。
この飛行隊はおよそ110人の体制で来年度発足します。
新田原基地には2027年度までにF-35B 20機を配備する計画が示されていて、来年度は最初の6機が配備されることになっています。

>>1199499
依照覺青的本事不需要服役
現在美國只要寫出PPT他們就能高潮成已經服役在腦海中暴揍PLA了，上次不就有個堅持明年就能量產的

陆自鱼鹰预防着陆, 变速箱内​​金属片.

https://nordot.app/1070310055766196304

陸自オスプレイが予防着陸、静岡
ギアボックスに金属片、被害なし

2023/09/01

ギアボックス内部に金属片ができたのが原因で、部品交換などの整備ができれば、基地から移動する。

>>1199872

This:

https://flyteam.jp/photo/3752598

撮影日
2023/09/01

撮影場所
静浜飛行場 - Shizuhama Air Base [RJNY]

機材・機種
Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey Bell Boeing MV-22B

機体記号
91708

航空会社
陸上自衛隊 - Japan Ground Self-Defense Force